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1971]

It has been suggested that Getty provides hope for a more modern
and better balanced handling of our natural resources.3 5 This is certainly a desired effect and in line with the court's recognition of our
public policy of developing mineral resources while at the same time
permitting the utilization of the surface for productive agricultural
uses.3 6 There is, however, a limit to the effective accommodation which
can be achieved or recognized between two conflicting interests. Although there are fact questions inherent in a determination of what
is reasonable, positive guidelines should be given when possible.8 7
The dissent points out that lease provisions were given very little
weight by the majority in arriving at their decision. This minimizing
of the contractual considerations coupled with the effective application
of the "due regard" concept, makes an inroad on the former emphasis
upon the mineral lessee's rights. This trend is more clearly revealed
when Getty is read in conjunction with Acker v. Guinn.38 The policy
or goal of our supreme court is not questioned; however, in an effort
to achieve balance between the lessee's rights and the surface owner's
interests, there may presently be a tendency to overemphasize the surface owner's rights.
Peter R. Tinsley
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EVIDENCE PERTAINS To A COLLATERAL MATTER OR Is DIRECTLY
RELATED To THE CRIME IN QUESTION. United States ex rel. Walker

v. Follette, 443 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1971).

Matthew Walker had been indicted for committing the crimes of
rape, attempted robbery, grand larceny and possession and use of a

dangerous weapon. The prosecution's chief witness was a woman who
testified that the petitioner, a man whom she had never seen before,
forced himself into her car, threatened her with a knife, struck her and
demanded her money. She alleged that the petitioner then took over
35 See Note, 2 TEx. TECH L. REv. 355 (1971).
36 Getty Oil Company v. Jones, 14 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 372, 375 (May 26, 1971).

37 Also, contractual considerations should not be minimized in an effort to put into
effect the policy regarding our mineral resources. It should be noted that prior cases
rarely refer to this policy statement that appears in Getty.
38 464 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. Sup. 1971).
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the wheel of the car and drove away with her. She further alleged that
he struck her again several times and eventually raped her. The petitioner's testimony was at a direct variance with that of the prosecution's
witness. He denied committing the crimes and testified that he and
the witness were well acquainted and their relations on that night were
entirely voluntary. Thus, the credibility of the petitioner was an extremely important issue in the case. In an apparent attempt to display
his good character the petitioner testified on direct examination that
he had never been convicted of a crime. On cross-examination the
prosecutor elicited testimony from the petitioner concerning two prior
convictions; a firearms violation and disorderly conduct. No contention
was made by the petitioner at the trial that he had not been represented
by counsel in these two prior convictions. The petitioner was convicted
by a jury verdict in the county court and the conviction was affirmed
by the appellate division.' Walker subsequently filed a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus in the District Court for the Southern District
of New York. Relying on the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Gideon v. Wainwright,2 the petitioner claimed that his right to a
fair trial, guaranteed by the sixth amendment, was violated when he
was cross-examined about the two prior convictions in which he allegedly was not represented by counsel.8 In denying the petition Judge
Mansfield stated that the petitioner's constitutional rights had not been
violated. 4 Held-Affirmed. A defendant's testimony, which is expounded
on direct examination or elicited on cross-examination, may be rebutted
by the prosecution's introduction of evidence, obtained in violation of
Gideon, for the purpose of impeaching the defendant's credibility, regardless of whether such evidence pertains to a collateral matter or is
directly related to the crime in question. The disposition of this case
is controlled by the recent Supreme Court decision in Harris v. New
York. 5 The fact that the constitutional infirmity in Harriswas a violation of Miranda, whereas in this case it was a violation of Gideon, has
no effect on the conclusion. When the petitioner elected to testify in
his own defense, he put his credibility in issue. By lying in the course
of his testimony, he opens the door for the prosecution to attack his
credibility by the admission of tainted evidence, provided such evidence
satisfies legal standards of trustworthiness.
1 People v. Walker, 265 N.Y.S.2d 609 (Sup. Ct. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 864, 87 S. Ct.
121, 17 L. Ed.2d 91 (1966).
2 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed.2d 799 (1963).
3 No objection was made by the petitioner during the trial because Gideon was not
decided until March 18, 1963, after the petitioner had been convicted. The rule in Gideon
is retroactive and therefore would be available to the petitioner. See Doughty v. Maxwell,
376 U.S. 202, 84 S. Ct. 702, 11 L. Ed.2d 650 (1965) (mem.); Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 375
U.S. 2, 84 S. Ct. 80, 11 L. Ed.2d 41 (1963) (mem.).
4 United States ex rel. Walker v. Follette, 311 F. Supp. 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
5 401 U.S. 222, 91 S. Ct. 643, 28 L. Ed.2d 1 (1971).
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The traditional common law doctrine of admitting evidence which
was procured by illegal means 6 was almost universally accepted 7 until
the Supreme Court's decision in Weeks v. United States8 established
the doctrine of excluding evidence which had been secured in violation
of constitutional safeguards. 9 In Weeks the trial court permitted the
admission of evidence which had been seized by a United States marshal
from the defendant's home, in his absence and without a search warrant. In reversing the defendant's conviction, Justice Day stated:
The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to
punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the
sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor
and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the
fundamental law of the land. The United States Marshal . . .
acted without sanction of law, doubtless prompted by the desire
to bring further proof to the aid of the Government, and under
color of his office undertook to make a seizure of private papers
in direct violation of the constitutional prohibition against such
action.' 0
The Supreme Court subsequently extended the scope of this exclusionary doctrine in the cases of Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States" and Agnello v. United States.12 The decision in Silverthorne
displayed the Court's willingness to extend the Weeks doctrine beyond
the exclusion of the immediate fruits of the search.' 3 Government agents
6 C. MCCORMICK, LAW oF EviDEN E, § 137, at 291 (1954).
7 Prior to 1914, the Supreme Court deviated from the traditional view on one occasion.
In Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S. Ct. 524, 29 L. Ed. 746 (1885), the Court stated
that an order to produce an incriminating document was an unlawful search and since it
was secured in violation of the fourth amendment it was inadmissible. In 1904, the Court
reapproved the traditional doctrine of the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence by
impliedly overruling Boyd in the case of Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 24 S. Ct. 372,
48 L. Ed. 575 (1904).
8 232 U.S. 383, 34 S. Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652 (1914).
9 The Court's decision in Weeks applied only to the federal law. In Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25, 69 S. Ct. 1359, 93 L. Ed. 1782 (1949), the Court stated that the right of
privacy, protected by the fourth amendment, was binding on the states through the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment, however, the federal exclusionary rule of
Weeks was held not to be a part of the fourth amendment, and thus was not binding on
the states. The federal exclusionary rule was ultimately imposed on the states in the
cases of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed.2d 1081 (1961) (fourth amendment); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S. Ct. 1489, 12 L. Ed.2d 653 (1964) (fifth amendment); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed.2d 799 (1963) (sixth
amendment).
10 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393, 34 S. Ct. 341, 344, 58 L. Ed. 652, 656 (1914).
(Emphasis added.)
11 251 U.S. 385, 40 S. Ct. 182, 64 L. Ed. 319 (1920).
12269 U.S. 20, 46 S. Ct. 4, 70 L. Ed. 145 (1925).
13 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392, 40 S. Ct. 182, 183, 64 L.
Ed. 319, 321 (1920). In Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed.2d
441 (1963), the Court stated that the "fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine" is not limited
to physical tangible evidence. See generally Note, Fruit of the Poisonous Tree-A Plea For
Relevant Criteria, 115 U. PA. L. RErv. 1136 (1967).
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attempted to use the knowledge gained from the use of the photographed
copies of papers illegally seized from the defendant company's premises
to cause subpoenas to be issued requiring production of the original
papers. The government, while in form repudiating and condemning
the illegal seizure, attempted to use this evidence in an indirect violation of the defendant's constitutional rights under the fourth amendment. 14 Justice Holmes, delivering the opinion of the Court, declared:
The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence
in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall15 not
be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all.

As a result of these cases, the courts refused to allow the introduction
of evidence which was either a direct' or an indirect 7 violation of the
fourth amendment.
In the case of Agnello v. United States the prosecution introduced
into evidence a can of cocaine, which had been illegally obtained from
the defendant's room, to rebut the testimony given by the defendant
on cross-examination. In reversing the defendant's conviction, the Court
held:
[T]he contention that the evidence of the search and seizure was
admissible in rebuttal is without merit. In his direct examination,
Agnello was not asked and did not testify concerning the can of
cocaine. In cross-examination, .

.

. he said he had never seen it.

He did nothing to waive his constitutional protection or to justify
cross-examination in respect of the evidence claimed to have been
obtained by the search ....

The admission of evidence obtained

by the search and seizure was error and prejudicial to the rights
of Frank Agnello.' s
In 1954, the Court was called upon in the case of Walder v. United
States19 to determine whether the defendant's assertions on direct
examination opened the door, solely for the purpose of attacking the
defendant's credibility, to the admission of illegally obtained evidence
which stemmed from an earlier proceeding. 20 On direct examination
the defendant stated that he had never possessed, purchased or sold
narcotics. The prosecution on cross-examination asked the defendant
14 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391, 40 S. Ct. 182, 182, 64 L.
Ed. 319, 320 (1920).
15 Id. at 392, 40 S. Ct. at 183, 64 L. Ed. at 321. (Emphasis added.)
16Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S. Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652 (1914).
17 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 40 S. Ct. 182, 64 L. Ed. 319
(1920).
18 Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 35, 46 S. Ct. 4, 7, 70 L. Ed. 145, 150 (1925),
quoting from Justice Holmes' opinion in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251
U.S. 385, 392, 40 S. Ct. 182, 183, 64 L. Ed. 319, 321 (1920).
19 347 U.S. 62, 74 S. Ct. 354, 98 L. Ed. 503 1954). See Note, 32 TEXAS L. REv. 883 (1954).
20Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64, 74 S. Ct. 354, 355, 98 L. Ed. 503, 506 (1954).
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about a heroin capsule which was unlawfully seized from the defendant's
home in connection with a previous arrest. The evidence was admitted
over the defendant's objections. The trial judge charged the jury that
this evidence was not to be considered for determining the defendant's
guilt, but solely for the purpose of impeaching the defendant's credibility. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the majority, stated:
It is one thing to say that the Government cannot make an
affirmative use of evidence unlawfully obtained. It is quite another
to say that the defendant can turn the illegal method by which
evidence in the Government's possession was obtained to his own
advantage, and provide himself with a shield against contradiction
of his untruths. Such an extension of the 2Weeks
doctrine would
1
be a perversion of the Fourth Amendment.
The Court stated that the Constitution guarantees the defendant the
right to deny all the elements of a case against him without thereby
22
allowing the prosecution to introduce constitutionally infirm evidence.
When the defendant goes beyond the mere denial of complicity in the
crimes for which he was charged and perjures himself, he should not
then be allowed to capitalize on the government's disability to use such
tainted evidence to challenge his credibility. 23 The Court sharply contrasted the situation in this case with that in Agnello.24 The defendant
in Agnello made no perjurious statements on direct examination, as
did the defendant in the Walder case. The constitutionally infirm evidence in Agnello was directly related to the crime for which he was
being charged, whereas in Walder such evidence related to collateral
matters.
In 1968, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
in the case of United States v. Fox,25 adhered to the principles set out
in Walder and Agnello. In Fox the defendant denied on cross-examination that he had given an inconsistent statement to government agents
after his arrest. The trial court permitted the government on rebuttal
to prove the inconsistent statement, even though the statement was
given without the benefit of the Mirandawarnings. The Second Circuit,
in reversing the defendant's conviction, stated that the doctrine expressed in Walder could not be extended to the facts of this case. 26
21 Id. at 65, 74 S. Ct. at 356, 98 L. Ed. at 507.
22 Id.
23 Id. Cf. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 69 S.Ct.
24 Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 66, 74 S.Ct. 354, 356,

213, 93 L. Ed. 168 (1948).
98 L. Ed. 503, 507 (1954).
25 403 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1968). Contra, United States v. Vanterpool, 394 F.2d 697 (2d Cir.
1968); United States v. Anderson, 394 F.2d 743 (2d Cir. 1968), where the "warnings," given
prior to the decision in Miranda, went much further toward complying with the substance
of Miranda than those given in Fox.
26 United States v. Fox, 403 F.2d 97, 103 (2d Cir. 1968). Contra, United States v. Curry,
358 F.2d 904 (2d Cir. 1966), where the court extended the Walder doctrine by permitting
the use of statements which were illegally obtained from the defendant in order to im-

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

5

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 3 [2022], No. 2, Art. 16

[Vol. 3

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

In explanation of this refusal to extend the Walder doctrine, the Second
Circuit drew a fine distinction between Walder and this case. In Walder
the defendant's testimony was given on direct examination and was
related to a collateralmatter. In Fox the testimony was elicited on crossexamination and was directly related to the crime in question.
The recent Supreme Court case of Harris v. New York 27 revitalized
and broadened the Court's decision in Walder.28 The majority recognized and even pointed out the fact that in Walder the defendant was
impeached as to collateral matters included in his direct examination,
whereas in Harristhe petitioner was impeached as to testimony elicited
on cross-examinationand related directly to the crime for which he was
being charged. 29 Mr. Chief Justice Burger, speaking for the majority,
stated:
We are not persuaded that there is a difference in principle that
warrants a result different from that reached by the Court in
Walder.... The impeachment process here undoubtedly provided

valuable aid to the jury in assessing petitioner's credibility, and
the benefits of this process should not be lost, .

.

. because of the

speculative possibility that impermissible police conduct will be
encouraged thereby.8 0
In rendering their decision in Harris the Court considered certain exclusionary language in Miranda v. Arizona.31
Some comments in the Miranda opinion can indeed be read as
indicating a bar to use of an uncounseled statement for any purpose, but discussion of that issue was not at all necessary to the
Court's holding and cannot be regarded as controlling .... It does

not follow from Miranda that evidence inadmissible against an

peach his credibility on collateral matters not directly related to the question of guilt or
contradictory of his allegations regarding the facts. See generally Comment, The Impeachment Exception to the Exclusionary Rules, 34 U. Cmi. L. R v. 939 (1967).
27 401 U.S. 222, 91 S. Ct. 643, 28 L. Ed.2d 1 (1971). See Comment, Impeachment of a
Defendant-Witness By the Use of Illegally Obtained Statements: From "Walder" to
"Harris"--The Exception Becomes the Rule, 22 SYRACuSE L. R~rv. 685 (1971); Note, 52
MIL. L. REv. 180 (1971). See generally Cole, Impeachment With Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence: Coming to Grips With the Perjurious Defendant, 62 J. CRiM. LAW 1
(1971).
28 Note, 52 MIL. L. REv. 180 (1971).
29 Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, -, 91 S. Ct. 643, 645, 28 L. Ed.2d 1, 4 (1971).
8o Id.
81 Id. The Court in Miranda said:
The privilege against self-incrimination protects the individual from being compelled
to incriminate himself in any manner; it does not distinguish degrees of incrimination .... [S]tatements merely intended to be exculpatory by the defendant are often
used to impeach his testimony at trial or to demonstrate untruths in the statement
given under interrogation and thus to prove guilt by implication. These statements
are incriminating in any meaningful sense of the word and may not be used without
the full warnings and effective waiver required for any other statement.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1629, 16 L. Ed.2d 694, 725 (1966).
The majority in Harris treated this language as dictum, while the minority relied on the
same language in their conclusions.
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accused in the prosecution's case in chief is barred for all purposes,
provided of course that the trustworthiness of the evidence satisfies
legal standards.82
The Court further stated:
The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a
license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of
confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.s
The dissenting opinion in Harris based its conclusion on the distinctions propounded in the Walder caseY 4 The minority stated that in
Walder, collateral evidence was used to impeach the defendant's direct
testimony, whereas in Harris the petitioner was impeached as to matters directly related to the crimes for which he was being charged.85
Mr. Justice Brennan, delivering the dissenting opinion, pointed out
that the Court in Walder held:
Of course, the Constitution guarantees a defendant the fullest
opportunity to meet the accusation against him. He must be free
to deny all the elements of the case against him without thereby
giving leave to the government to introduce by way of rebuttal
evidence illegally secured by it, and therefore not available for its
case in chief.8 6
...
a
87
defendant the fullest opportunity to meet the accusation against him."
Justice Brennan stated that the Court in Miranda made the fifth amend88
ment's privilege against self-incrimination one of these guarantees.
The dissent interpreted the language used by the Court in Miranda09
to mean an exclusion of all tainted evidence for any purpose, and to

Walder did not specify which constitutional guarantees allow

effect a complete disposal of ".

.

. any distinction between statements

' 40
used on direct as opposed to cross-examination.
Speaking for the Second Circuit, in the case of United States ex rel.
Walker v. Follette,41 Judge McLean stated that the disposition of this
case is controlled by Harris and is also controlled by Walder because
32

Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, -, 91 S. Ct. 643, 645, 28 L. Ed.2d 1, 4 (1971).
91 S. Ct. at 646, 28 L. Ed.2d at 5.

33 Id. at -,
84 Id.
35 Id.

86 Id. at -,
91 S. Ct. at 647, 28 L. Ed.2d at 7, citing Walder v. United States, 347 U.S.
62, 65, 74 S. Ct. 354, 356, 98 L. Ed. 503, 507 (1954).
37 Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, -, 91 S. Ct. 643, 647, 28 L. Ed.2d 1, 7 (1971).
88 Id.
39 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1629, 16 L. Ed.2d 694, 725 (1966).
40 Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, -,
91 S. Ct. 643, 648 n.4, 28 L. Ed.2d 1, 8 n.4
(1971). Six federal courts of appeals and the appellate courts of fourteen states have
applied the language in Miranda (citations omitted). Only three state appellate courts have
followed the interpretation given this language by Harris (citations omitted).
41443 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1971).
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the factual situation in the instant case is closer to that in Walder, in
that both defendants gave inconsistent statements on direct examination and both defendants were impeached by the use of illegal evidence
relating to collateral matters.42 The court concluded that:
It can make no difference that the constitutional infirmity in
Harris and in Walder was a violation of Miranda whereas here it
was a violation of Gideon. The principle is the same in either event.
If a defendant testifies, he puts his credibility in issue. If he lies
in the course of his testimony, he lays himself open to attack by
means of illegal evidence which otherwise the prosecution could
43
not use against him.
The Second Circuit could have justified their decision in Walker by
relying only on the principles stated in Walder. The fact that the
defendants in both cases testified as to collateral matters on direct
examination would appear to constitute sufficient justification. Instead,
the court held that Harris also governs this decision, even though in
Harris the prosecution elicited the inconsistent statements from the
petitioner on cross-examination and they were directly related to the
crime for which he was charged. Thus, Walker completely abolished
the distinctions the Second Circuit made in Fox.44 The effect of such
a sweeping decision amounts to an extension of the Harris case in that
all utterances made by a defendant in the course of his testimony may
be rebutted for impeachment purposes by the admission of any prior
inconsistencies, no matter how constitutionally infirm they may be, as
long as such inconsistencies otherwise satisfy legal standards of trustworthiness. 45 It makes no difference that the "prior inconsistencies"
may have been violations of the fourth, fifth or sixth amendments.
An accused individual has constitutional guarantees which afford
him an opportunity to deny all of the elements of the case against him. 46
As a result of Harrisand Walker, if a defendant elects to testify in his
own defense, a jury will be able to hear all the evidence accumulated by
the prosecution, whether legally or illegally obtained, provided such
evidence satisfies legal standards of trustworthiness. This defendant
would be considered foolish to even take the stand in his own defense
if the circumstances surrounding his arrest provide the government
with prior inconsistencies in the defendant's story. 47 There is no
authority for the proposition that the prosecution will completely
disregard judicially protected rights in order to obtain evidence which
42 d. at 170.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65, 74 S. Ct. 354, 356, 98 L. Ed. 503, 507 (1954).
47 Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, -, 91 S. Ct. 643, 649, 28 L. Ed.2d 1, 9 (1971).
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